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Levinson: Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?

SUFFRAGE AND COMMUNITY: WHO SHOULD VOTE?
Sanford Levinson*
Over the past decade one of the richest debates in American political theory has been that between "liberals" and "communitarians."1
Although no canonical definitions of these terms exist, 2 certain snapshots of thought portray (what are thought to be) the different parts
of the intellectual landscape. Although classical liberalism might well
be identified with a specific theory of a limited state,3 in the contemporary debate, "liberalism" is identified more often, especially by critics, as a theory of the self and its relationship with the polity. Thus,
Michael Sandel, a leading communitarian political theorist, has
criticized liberals for advancing the notion of an autonomous, acontextual self.4 He emphasizes instead the various "encumbrances" of social
context that not only "limit" the self but, more importantly, serve to
"constitute" a genuine self. 5 These "encumbrances" include ways of
looking at the world imparted to persons through both formal socialization processes and everyday living in particular social worlds.
But even if we recognize that no "self' is unencumbered, the question remains about the specific role of the polity in promoting a particular set of encumbrances. Most liberals would argue that the self
develops outside of the political order - in families, churches, the
workplace, etc. The crucial point is that the preferences held by these

*Charles T. McCormick Professor of Law and Professor of Government, University of Texas
at Austin. I presented an earlier version of this article at the 1988 meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2, 1988. I am grateful to Joseph
Carens, Donald Moon, and Nancy Rosenblum for their comments on that occasion. I subsequently
presented the article to the Constitutional Studies Colloquium at the University of Texas Law
School, and have especially benefited from the remarks of my colleagues Jim Fishkin, Doug
Laycock, Scot Powe, and Charles Silver.
1. For the most recent manifestation of this debate, see Symposium: The Republic Civic
Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). In this essay, I use the terms "republican" critics of
liberalism synonymously with "communitarians." The academic meanings of the terms "liberal"
and "republican" have very little, if anything, in common with their use in ordinary public
discourse.
2. For an argument that fewer differences may exist between the two camps than might
first be thought, see generally N. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT (1987).
3. See, e.g. id. at 72-73.
4. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-15 (1982).
5. Id. at 179-81.
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selves develop externally to the polity. 6 Each self, or collective group
of selves, enters the political realm to achieve the maximum realization
of these "prepolitical" preferences. 7 In the words of Dunwodv lecturer
Frank Michelman, for such liberals "good politics can only be a marketlike medium through which variously interested and motivated individuals and groups seek to maximize their own particular preferences." 8
Self-styled "republicans," on the other hand, emphasize not only
the notion of the "encumbered" self, but also the view of politics as
transformative. The very conception of one's self - and of one's preferences - is shaped by participation in the political realm and by the
realization that the polity is more than a mere arena for bargaining.
As Aristotle first argued in the Politics,9 the polity is the association
that most truly constitutes us as "social" animals. 10 Within the theory
of classical republicanism that Professors Michelman and Sunstein are
seeking to revive, "[p]olitical participants [are] to subordinate their
private interests to the public good through political participation in
an ongoing process of collective self-determination."", Active participation in contemplating and discussing the public good with one's fellow
citizens is, according to Professor Michelman's reading of republicanism, "considered a positive human good because the self is understood as partially constituted by, or as coming to itself through, such
engagement."12 This conception of politics and ultimately of the self
sharply contrasts with the "pluralist" 3 perspective "in which the primary interests of individuals appear as prepolitical, and politics, acmedium for protecting
cordingly, appears as a secondary instrumental
4
or advancing those 'exogenous' interests."Y

My entry into this debate comes from my interest in elaborating
the content of American civil religion, particularly as it is organized
around the Constitution of the United States. 5 What "constitutes" us

6. They are, in the language of economics, "exogenous." See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1543 (1988).
7. See id. ('The goal of the system is to ensure that the various inputs are reflected
accurately in legislation .... ).
8. See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1508 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman,
Law's Republic].
9. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (E. Barker trans. 4th ed. 1961).
10. Id. at 6.
11. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1547-48.
12. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1503.
13. Which for our purposes can be read as synonymous with "liberal."
14. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 8, at 1503.
15. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH ch. 1 (1988).
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as distinctive members of this particular political community? This
question goes back at least to Crevocoeur's "What is the American,
this new man [and woman]?"16 I have been especially interested in
examining the notion of American "creedalism," i.e. the assumption,
and sometimes the insistence, that members of this political community
can be identified by reference to certain shared values and commitments. 17 Many of these shared values are "liberal," insofar as they
emphasize individual rights that preexist one's entrance into the polity.
But the emphasis on their shared nature and on the importance of
retaining a kind of political community committed to maintaining those
shared values speaks as well to the "communitarian" implication of
any "civil-religion" approach. Those who study (or assert the existence
of) civil religions ultimately study the particularities of "encumbered
selves" as they develop within our polity. After all, mutually encumbered selves constitute a community, just as in significant ways the
community serves to constitute the self.
An important question posed by (and to) communitarians concerns
the degree of homogeneity that a communitarian social order requires
of its members. The focus of such homogeneity can take many different
forms ranging from ethnicity, race, and social class to the sharing of
values suggested above. Many critics have accused communitarians
(and critics of liberalism) of being insufficiently sensitive to the repressive implications of this aspect of communitarianism.18 Among other
things, this criticism suggests that the philosophy one affirms truly
matters and that different philosphies are not simply two different
paths to the same practical conclusions.
I confess that I am never quite sure how much difference commitment to a particular, formal philosophical system makes. One tends
to become jaded by familiarity with the standard moves by which
antagonists such as Kantians and utilitarians avoid some of the more
unhappy implications of their own positions and often arrive at the
very same conclusions. 19 (Similar jadedness is sparked, concomitantly,

16. See id. at 4.
17. Id. at 94-99.
18. See, e.g., Herzog, Some Questionsfor Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986); Hirsch,
The Threnody of Liberalism: ConstitutionalLiberty and the Renewal of Community, 14 POL.
THEORY 423 (1986).

19. Kantians, who proclaim their indifference to consequences, must explain why it is
permissible to violate the duty to be truthful when a Nazi stormtrooper asks if you know where
Jews are hiding. The utilitarian, on the other hand, must explain why the preferences of moral
monsters who derive great pleasure from torturing innocent children are to be completely
discounted. I lmow of no Kantian who argues that one must tell the truth though the heavens
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by observing how one branch of Kantians may rage against another
and one utilitarian savage against another.) The pragmatist (or lawyer)
in me tends to be at times skeptical of the operational import of highly
abstract, theoretical approaches. Nonetheless, it often seems implausible to say that it doesn't matter at all which view one aligns with.
One mission of this essay is to explore some potential differences
between liberals and communitarians in regard to a particular issue
that is of special import to any polity. Thus, I will explore problems
a polity faces when deciding who can participate in the political process
by voting.
The eminent political scientist Robert Dahl noted almost twenty
years ago that deciding who can participate in the political process is
"a curiously neglected and yet absolutely crucial problem" for any
polity, for if democracy means "in some sense 'rule by the people,'
we need to clarify" who is entitled to participate in ruling through
casting the ballot.2° To be sure, this is not a wholly neglected problem,
especially within formal constitutional law. Anyone who teaches about
the fourteenth amendment must confront the extent to which it limits
the states' right to allocate the ballot. 2 1 One of the earliest cases construing the amendment was Minor v. Happersett= in which the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld Missouri's limitation of the ballot to males.3
Chief Justice Waite emphasized that women were surely citizens, but
that citizenship does not guarantee access to the ballot.4 Although
the nineteenth amendment makes this particular illustration moot2
even today no perfect congruence exists between citizenship and entitlement to vote. The past quarter century has seen much litigation
challenging the denial of the franchise to various and sundry folks.
For example, recent litigation has questioned limitations of the vote

fall and of no utilitarian who argues that all preferences are to be counted equally, though it

often takes many pages for each to explain why that is not the case. See, e.g. Barry, Book
Review, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 645-46 (1979) (reviewing, C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1977)).
20. See R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION 59 (1970); see also Dahl, ProceduralDemocracy, in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIETY, FIFTH SERIES 97, 97-133 (1979).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
22.
23.
24.

. .

.nor deny to

88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
Id. at 178.
Id. at 176.

25. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1 ('"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
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to persons who pay a poll tax,26 who pass a literacy test,2 who have
lived in the jurisdiction for at least a year,2 or who have not been
convicted of a felony32
The decisions resulting from such litigation - which hold that the
Constitution allows the disenfranchisement of illiterates and felons but
not of newcomers or persons who refuse to pay a poll tax - raise
complex problems for those interested in constitutional interpretation.
Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections,30 which struck down a statute
requiring voters to pay a poll tax to vote in state elections,'1 best
exemplifies these complex constitutional problems. The interpretive
problem is this: Two years earlier Congress proposed and the states
ratified the twenty-fourth amendment invalidating poll taxes as a prerequisite for federal elections.3 Either the twenty-fourth amendment
is entirely gratuitous, simply repeating what the Constitution mandates, or the Court wrongly decided Harper (a position that helped
to cost Robert Bork his seat on the Supreme Court). How could one
argue both that the amendment was "necessary" (i.e., the Constitution
would have a different meaning prior to the addition of that patch of
text and would have retained this meaning in the absence of its addition) and that the Court acted properly in Harper?
This essay will not explore problems of constitutional interpretation
as such, though I may refer to some specific decisions to illustrate
particular issues. Whatever the Constitution requires is subject to
evaluation from the perspective of general political theory. One could
decide that the "correct" interpretation of the Constitution generates

26. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (poll tax for state
elections unconstitutional).
27. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1970) (Congress has power to order
suspension of state literacy tests under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (literacy tests not per se unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment).
28. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (durational residency requirement of
more than 30 days unconstitutional).
29. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56-57 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of
depriving suffrage to felons).
30. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
31. Id. at 670.
32. The twenty-fourth amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or
for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
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a result sufficiently unjust to merit an amendment.3 At that point we
would be in the realm of '"pure" political theory and not in the realm
of constitutional interpretation. How then should we design our polity?
I want to contrast two basic models of allocating the ballot. These
models can be linked to the current debate between "liberals" (or
"pluralists") and "communitarians" (or "neo-republicans"). One model,
drawn from the liberal side of the spectrum, focuses on the presumed
interest of the person and on the duty of the polity to allow persons
to enunciate their interests through the ballot. Dahl refers to this
model as the "Principle of Affected Interests": "Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to
participate in that government."' Thus, the liberal model assumes
that all persons (or at least all citizens5) who live within a jurisdiction
ought to be able to vote because the legislative decisions of the jurisdiction affect them.
The emphasis on the interest of voters contributes to the traditional
liberal skepticism 6 about "competence-based" limitations on the ballot,
such as literacy or mental competence. After all, voters need not be
particularly bright or well-read to perceive their own interests. As
has often been noted, an illiterate can feel the pinch of the shoe she
37
is being asked to wear just as easily as the grande dame.
33. The much-discussed proposition for a flag amendment may be just such an example.
In the eyes of some, flag burning is sufficiently awful to merit an amendment, even if the
Supreme Court has decided that conviction for such desecration is inconsistent with the first
amendment. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), affig 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988).
34. R. DAHL, supra note 20, at 64.
35. I shall return presently to the validity of assuming that the suffrage can be restricted
to citizens. See supra text accompanying notes 38-63.
36. Though, as Dahl notes, this skepticism does not reach to outright opposition, as
exemplified by the exclusion of children from the suffrage, which
[i]s so often taken as unproblematical that one hardly notices how much the claim
to citizenship [and participation rights attached to citizenship] based on categorical
right is embarrassed by this simple exclusion: for it is made on the grounds that
children are not competent to govern themselves or the community. Yet if we
permit the exclusion of children from the demos (and who seriously does not?),
then we allow a contingent element, based on qualifications for governing, to limit
the universality of the claim based on categorical right.
Dahl, ProceduralDemocracy, supra note 20, at 113-14; see also Suffrage the Little Children,
THE NATION, Apr. 10, 1989, at 470 (letter to the editor advocating the grant of suffrage to
children on interest-based grounds).
37. See G. CHAUCER, The Merchant'sTale, in CANTERBURY TALES 419 (J. Nicolson trans.
ed. 1934) (1795) (see line 309: '"But I know best where pinches me my shoe."); S. CERVANTES,
THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIxOTE pt.1, ch.32, at 280 (J. Cohen trans. ed. 1950) (1604) ("As
if I didn't know... where my own shoe pinches."'). Much political education also occurs through
the speech-oriented media. Why literacy per se is thought to be a necessary attribute for exercise
of the franchise is therefore unclear.
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Someone who views elections as the forum for reflection on "common interest," however, might be more respectful of attempts to
guarantee the competence and the proper character of voters - i.e.,
the intellectual capacity for reflection on the common good and the
character disposition to subordinate merely "personal" interest to the
common good. Such attempts to guarantee voter competence and
character have fallen on hard times in recent years and would, I am
confident, be dismissed by most analysts as mere ideological justifications for preserving existing distributions of power rather than genuine
ways of maintaining the common good, even assuming that the term
is remotely comprehensible.
Examining the contemporary allocation of the ballot from this interest-based perspective, we immediately encounter certain problems.
To use the language of the lawyer, one discovers that allocation of
the ballot is grossly underinclusive. The current practice of allocating
voting rights by geographic residence and citizenship means that many
people who, by any criterion, are 'nterested" in legislative outcomes
are not allowed to vote. Why, for example, should New Jersey residents who work in New York not be allowed to vote in New York
city and state elections? Why are Central Americans affected by American policy vis-A-vis Nicaragua not allowed to vote in United States
presidential elections?- How do we explain, as a matter of political
theory, that "nonresidents . . . are disenfranchised, and they are

supposed to be so." 39 As Lea Brilmayer aptly puts it, such denial of
38. What makes this a more difficult case is that some of these Central Americans are
"official" adversaries of the United States. American policy is designed to cause them grief.
This is not, then, a case in which "externalities" are visited upon third parties (e.g., the unrepresented New Jersey resident) because of an indifference to the outsider's interests. As to the
latter, one can imagine advocating the vote for third parties victimized by such indifference (or,
in the alternative, elaborating a "footnote four" kind of analysis that would entitle such parties
to additional judicial scrutiny of legislation adverse to their interests). See United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"); cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980) (extensive elaboration of such a theory). But see Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting Its Own,23 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 173 (1981) (examining premise that
a state has a greater interest in protecting its own citizens than it has in protecting others). A
difference exists between indifference and well-thought-out hostility directed at someone who
is not by any account a member of one's own polity. No one would seriously suggest that
Germans should have voted in the American elections of 1940 and 1944 because the results of
those elections vitally affected them. Fortunately, resolution of such conundrums is beyond the
ambitions of this essay.
39. Brilmayer, Shaping andSharing in DemocraticTheory: Towards a PoliticalPhilosophy
of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 389, 390 (1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

suffrage works to separate "the
shaping of the laws . . . from the
'40
sharing of its consequences.
When I presented this essay at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, 41 two members of the panel on which I
participated illustrated the point I am making. Professor Joseph Carens is an American citizen living and working in Canada, where he
teaches political theory at Toronto University; Professor Nancy
Rosenblum lives in Massachusetts but teaches at Brown University,
in Providence, Rhode Island. Professor Carens cannot vote in any
Canadian elections, even though they might affect his interests. I do
not know if he retains citizenship in a particular state of the United
States, which would allow him to vote in our presidential election and
in elections for public officials who formally "represent" the citizens
of the state, whether in state or national fora. Election of the President
through the electoral college mechanism, founded on the priority of
state as against national membership, means that mere citizens of the
United States - unlike citizens of the United States who are also
citizens of a particular state - have no right at all to vote for the
presidency.4 Puerto Ricans, who are American citizens without the
right to vote for any federal office, best exemplify this point.4 3
Professor Rosenblum has a different problem: Although she is a
citizen of Massachusetts and can vote for president of the United
States, the decisions of the Rhode Island Legislature (or, more likely,
the Mayor of Providence) also may vitally affect her, but she is without
electoral recourse in Rhode Island. Liberals should question the justice
of this deprivation. Liberals should find it insufficient to say, with
Professor Brilmayer, 'We ordinarily do not expect to vote except in
our home state's elections, although the actions of other states have
important consequences for us."" Someone might ask why this "expectation" should be honored any more than the "expectation" that women
will remain in the home.4 5 What if Professor Rosenblum announces
that her deep reading of the American devotion to constitutional
liberalism leads her to expect that she will be granted the right to
vote in Rhode Island, at least for certain public officials?

40. Id.
41. Address by Sanford Levinson, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting
(Sept. 2, 1988).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
43. 48 U.S.C. § 891 (1987).
44. See Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 401.
45. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (state prohibition forbidding
women a license to practice law constitutional).
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Questioning the complete denial of the ability to vote is not identical to
asking why Professor Rosenblum does not get an equal vote relative to
full-scale Rhode Islanders. Perhaps she (and other persons in her situation) should get only half-votes in Rhode Island. The modern interpretation of the equal protection clause s engenders a belief that those who may
vote get an equal vote relative to all others entitled to vote.47 We
should be wary, however, of mixing the two different issues of basic
entitlement to vote and the weight to which that vote is entitled.
Whether or not United States Supreme Court jurisprudence is sound
constitutional law, we have no reason to assume its theoretical cogency.
The most immediate principled answer to support the exclusions
mentioned above is that those deprived of the vote are not citizens
of the relevant jurisdiction, either city, state, or nation. My colleague
Douglas Laycock writes that "[t]he restriction of voting

. . .

to the

residents of each state is essential to the states' existence as separate
polities" and that "the logic of the constitutional structure is that at
any given time, each of us is a member of one and only one state
polity. 48 Laycock's argument is not "logical"; the constitutional concept
of "stateness" need not include as a predicate the proposition that a
person can be a citizen of only one state or that the ballot must be
restricted only to physical residents of a given state. Dual nationals,
persons with completely valid legal citizenship in more than one national polity, exist in legal fact. As a consequence, some citizens of
other countries participated in the recent election of the president of
the United States and will help to choose the next mayor of New
York City by virtue of their citizenship in the United States and in
the State of New York.
Similarly, dual citizenship within the United States could exist.
Individuals could be citizens of more than one state, with concomitant
voting rights in all of the states in which they have established the
prerequisite for citizenship (e.g., residence or property ownership or
holding a permanent job, etc.). Only one vote for federal offices would
still be appropriate. Professor Rosenblum, for example, should not be

46.

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563-64 (1964) ("one person, one vote" as the

basic constitutional standard, citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
47. For an impressive delineation of all of the difficulties presented anyone who tries to
ascertain what "equality" in voting might mean, see Still, Political Equality and Election
Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1981).
48. Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 431, 434

(1987) (emphasis added). Laycock's argument is offered as constitutional interpretation rather
than political philosophy, but his interpretation rests on theoretical assumption.
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able to vote for presidential electors or members of Congress in both
Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Multiple votes for federal offices
would violate important principles of equal citizenship. 49 On the other
hand, whether Professor Rosenblum should have some form of dual
citizenship and whether she can legitimately cast ballots for both Massachusetts and Rhode Island elected officials are separate issues. We
do not recognize such dual status; thus, a citizen of Massachusetts
cannot legally also be a citizen of Rhode Island (anymore than, in the
United States, the spouse of A can also be the legal spouse of B).50
But why not? Conceptually, dual "statists" could exist within our own
country. We therefore should ask why we adhere to a model of political
exclusivity when other models are available and attractive. One may
agree with Professors Brilmayer and Laycock that the Constitution
does not compel such dual voting rights and that the Supreme Court
would be ill-advised to order Rhode Island to allow Professor
Rosenblum to vote in its elections.5 1 That the Supreme Court should
not compel Rhode Island to welcome Professor Rosenblum's participation in its elections does not rule out, however, that Rhode Island
could welcome her voluntarily. Recognition of dual state citizenship
and concomitant participation rights is still a good idea. We might
have a better political order if states recognized the injustice of denying
those with strong and establishable interests in their decisions the
opportunity to take part in voting for public officials.
Both the established status of international dual citizenship and
the practices of the two major American political parties also support
the plausibility of expanding the part of those enlisted to participate
in elections. American citizens who cannot vote for national officials
within the formal political structure nonetheless have voting rights in
the national conventions that select presidential candidates. Delegates
from Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, and, within the
Democratic Party, delegates representing American citizens living in
Europe participate in national conventions. 52 To be sure, the nature

49. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
50. Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 1, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1988) ("All persons who are citizens of
the United States and who are domiciled in this commonwealth are citizens thereof.").
51. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 48.
52. At the 1988 Democratic National Presidential Convention, American Samoa received 6

delegates, Guam, 4; Puerto Rico, 57; the Virgin Islands, 5; and Democrats living abroad, 9. Telephone interview with Michael Rubenstein, Democratic National Committee (Apr. 28, 1989)
(referring to the Official Proceedings of the 1988 Democratic National Presidential Convention).
Similarly, George Bush was nominated at the 1988 Republican National Presidential Convention
that included 4 delegates from Guam, 14 from Puerto Rico, and 4 from the Virgin Islands. The
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of this participation is symbolic; these delegates are unlikely to provide
the margin of victory in a closely contested struggle. As Justice Holmes
reminded us many years ago, though, we live by symbols 3 Both
parties knowingly reach out and welcome all citizens who have an
interest in formal party deliberations. Is it so unthinkable, then, that
American states might similarly include dual "statists"?
The discussion above assumed the relevance of citizenship in allocating the voting franchise. We thus enter the realm of the second basic
theory undergirding allocation of the ballot - communal membership.6
Citizenship can be conceived of as the legal recognition of community
membership. Limiting the franchise to citizens may be a way of saying
that only genuine members of the political community can vote. Even
resident aliens cannot vote, whatever their "interest," because they
are presumed not to be genuine members of the political community.
This presumption is not logically necessary. Quite a few nineteenth
century state constitutions included guarantees of the right to vote
for aliens who indicated their intention to become citizens of the United
States; such noncitizens voted in some states as late as 1928. Today,
all states require state citizenship to vote. 6
For the resident alien, the combination of permanent residence
and overwhelming interest is not enough to warrant the ballot. Within
the community of constitutional lawyers, the exclusion of noncitizens
from the ballot has provoked little serious opposition.l Most trained
lawyers would regard litigation premised on the view that the fourteenth amendment bars exclusion of noncitizens from the ballot as
"frivolous."
Citizenship, however, is a purely formal category. A citizen of a
given community need not reside in it to vote. The absentee ballot
benefits not only the person who is out of the jurisdiction on election
day, but also the person like my daughter, attending school in the
Northeast (from which region I suspect she will never return to Texas,

1992 Republican National Presidential Convention will include four delegates from American
Samoa, but no one representing Americans living abroad. Telephone conversation with a staff
member of the Republican National Committee (May 2, 1989) (reading from the National Convention Delegate Selection Procedures Manual (1988 convention) and the Rules of the Republican
Party adopted by the 1988 Republican National Convention (assignment of delegates to American
Samoa)).
54. See supra text accompanying note 34.
55. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection:Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092, 1098 (1977) (those states included Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin).
56. Id. at 1099-100.
57. See id.
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save for visits), who remains eligible to participate in the affairs of
Texas solely because of the formality of continuing citizenship there.
Similarly, if Joseph Carens can vote in American elections, it will be
because he remains a formal citizen of a state in which he no longer
resides (and to which he quite likely never will return).
We have seen above that not all citizens are eligible to vote. However, all voters must be citizens. Why do we so automatically (almost
thoughtlessly) link citizenship and suffrage? The answer may require
that we ask about the meaning of citizenship to those persons classified
as citizens and to the state that so designates them. Does (or should)
citizenship involve participation in a common way of life or commitment
to common values? Such commonality as exists presumably affects the
conception of individual "interest" held by particular individuals. It is
not that citizens are without interests; rather, the classical republican
argument is that strong communal membership somehow tames the
unfettered interest of the asocial self and adds a notion of common
interest and common good. One defines oneself as a member of the
community and, concomitantly, one's self-interest as that of the collectivity.
However liberal the fundamental political culture of the United
States may be, republican aspects remain. The unum of a shared
experience receives its due as against the pluribus of differentiation.
This seems to be implied, for example, by the legal requirements that
we (that is, those of us who are already within the political community
and who get to participate in the framing of naturalization laws for
those who wish to join it) make of applicants for citizenship. They
must demonstrate "attachment" to the "principles of the Constitution"
and swear loyalty to the Constitution as conditions for being welcomed
into the political community and receiving the precious status of
citizenship.5
Similarly, in analyzing the constitutional law of involuntary denationalization, i.e., the ability of the United States to strip citizenship
away even against the professed desire of the person involved, Professor Alex Aleinikoff presents a communitarian notion of citizenship that
emphasizes an "attachment to the core principles of society" as part
of 'the individual's conception of self."59 Insufficient attachment to
these core principles warrants either denying entry to the political
community or, more controversially, withdrawing membership in the
community from those who have been members 0 A similar theory
58. See S. LEVINSON, supra note 15, ch. 3.
59. See Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (1986).
60. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss3/5

12

Levinson: Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?
SUFFRAGE AND COMMUNITY

may account for withdrawing the franchise from convicted felons. To
disobey the law is to manifest sufficient repudiation of communitarian
bonds to justify excluding lawbreakers from participating in ruling the
community through participation in elections.
Perhaps one learns something significant upon discovery that a
person is a convicted felon. But precisely what one learns is highly
controversial, for some laws merit disobedience in the name of the
deepest community values. In contrast, one hardly learns anything
significant about a person's commitments when discovering that he or
she is a citizen of a particular state - save perhaps for Texas! The
fact of national citizenship is little more illuminating. If we asked
persons only five yes-or-no questions to figure out their basic values,
would citizenship be one of them? If the answer is "no," because a
person's citizenship conveys too little relevant information, then we
might ask why something as important as the vote is based on citizenship, even within a communalist perspective.
I argued above that a conception of citizenship as a surrogate for
shared interests is a fatally underinclusive category because the universe of people whose interests are vitally affected by any given election is far larger than the universe of those who are allowed to participate in choosing public officials (who then in turn set the public
agenda). If we view citizenship as a surrogate for shared values, then
it may be grossly overinclusive: the set of people sharing the (proper)
values may be far smaller than the set of people designated as citizens.
Noncitizens also may share what are thought to be the requisite values.
This emphasis on shared attachment to core principles itself raises a
host of questions.
The central question is whether as a polity we ought to require
certain value commitments of those who vote. I suspect that most
traditional liberals tend to be horrified by such a suggestion insofar
as they see an election as an arena to which persons bring their own
values and interests. (How, therefore, can a liberal justify the limitation of the franchise to citizens, whether of city, state, or nation?) On
the other hand, communitarians should find it more palatable to restrict participation rights to those who are genuine members, but it
is hard to see why they would be satisfied with a purely formal test
of legal citizenship instead of a more complete examination of the
putative member's actual commitments.
I have written that, "[a]s a person born in the United States...
I received my citizenship - and suffrage - 'for free,' as it were,
without any requirement of an affirmative manifestation of community
membership on my part other than formal registration to vote. '61 But
61.

See S. LEVINSON, suyra note 15, at 104 (emphasis in original).
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a resident alien, whose interest in the outcome of an election may be
just as great, (indeed greater in some instances, than mine)* cannot
vote without first becoming a formal member of the community by
demonstrating constitutional "attachment" and swearing an oath of
commitment to the Constitution. 3 If a resident alien must take these
steps, does it make any less sense to require these same steps of a
natural citizen? Requiring formal steps does not necessarily call into
question basic citizenship, but citizenship alone does not grant the
right to vote. Something more is necessary, beginning with the minimal requirement of surviving until one's eighteenth birthday.64 The
question is: Why shouldn't we require manifestation of attachment to
our alleged "core values" before allowing a citizen to vote?
The loyalty oath is one such common manifestation. Consider, for
example, the oath Massachusetts requires of its employees:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend
the Constitution of the United States of America and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that
I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United
States or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method.6
I have given similar assurances on a number of occasions. Every
lawyer or law student has or will swear similar oaths.
Our society is not particularly averse to loyalty oaths. Our United
States Constitution refers to oaths and their importance no less than
three times.6 Article VI contains the most important reference. For
an officeholder to actively participate in any level of American government, Article VI requires that the officeholder take an oath of fidelity
to the Constitution.67 Whatever our views may be of the propriety (or

62. For example, a resident alien may be more immediately affected by state policies
involving welfare benefits or eligibility for public employment.
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.041(1)(a) (1987) (must be citizen to vote); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1448 (1982).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
65. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 683 (1972) (upholding this oath).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (presidential oath of office); U.S. CONST. art. VI,

cl. 3 (requirement that all public officials affirm fidelity to the Constitution); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 3 (ineligibility for public office, without congressional consent, of one who, having
previously sworn fidelity to the United States, engaged in rebellion against the United States).
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("lt]he Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution").
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even cogency) of Massachusetts's requiring state employees to affirm
their commitment to the United States Constitution, it would violate
the Constitution if Massachusetts did not exact such an oath from its
governor or from all other elected public officials.
One reason the eighteenth-century drafters of the Constitution
emphasized oaths may lie within liberal theory's emphasis on the primacy of autonomy and the necessity to give consent to limitations of
independence. John Locke pronounced that "[p]romises, covenants,
and oaths" are "the bonds of human society. '" In 1792, James Madison
wrote about "charters of government" that, "[a]s trusts" to be executed
by public officials, "none can be more sacred, because they are bound
on the conscience by the religious sanctions of an oath." 69 Loyalty
oaths, however, long predated the development of liberal theory.7 0
Other theories justify their use as well. No social order seems willing
to eliminate them (or their functional equivalents) entirely. Practical
questions concern who must take the oaths and what they must say
rather than whether some oaths will be required of some persons.
One may argue that it is unnecessary for native-born persons to
proffer the oaths we require from naturalized citizens; simply being
born and raised in this country assures socialization into the set of
"core values" alluded to by Professor Aleinikoff.71 This proposition is
empirical rather than truly theoretical unless one makes the vacuous
point that our core values can be identified by reference to what any
person who happened to have been born and raised in the United
States believes. Those who speak of core community values presumably have in mind something they can match against the views of any
particular member (or would-be member) of the community, including
the native born. The potential to designate commitments or behavior
as "un-American" has led Garry Wills to oppose American creedalism,
i.e., the identification of given ideas as "American" or as attached to
the polity: "If there is an American idea, then one must subscribe to
it in order to be an American."72
The fear of an overweening state and the history of such institutions
as the House Unamerican Activities Committee provide more than

68. S. LEVINSON, supranote 15, at 93 (quoting J. LOCKE, TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 212 (C. Sherman ed. 1979) (3d ed. 1698)).
69. Id. (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF JAMES MIADISON 191 (R. Rutland ed. 1983)).
70. See, e.g., Exodus, 24:3 (detailing the acceptance of God's covenant by Israelites). The
swearing of an oath of fealty was also, of course, a central aspect of feudalism. See, e.g., F.
GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 27 (1964) (describing mutual contact between vassal and lord).
71. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
72.

G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

xxii (1978).
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enough reason for Wills to reject the suggested analysis. One would
have to be foolish indeed to scoff at Wills's fears. The same dilemmas
remain, however: If we accept Wills's argument, why should we not
eliminate the "attachment" and loyalty oath requirements that the
United States imposes on naturalized citizens? Why should we not
require only a specific length of residency and, perhaps, behavioral
conformity to legal duties? Whatever their bad repute among most
liberals, few are so disdainful of the "attachment" and loyalty oath
requirements that they would eliminate the requirement that
naturalized citizens vow "to support the Constitution of the United
States." Nor do many liberals support amending the Constitution to
74 or the more general oath
remove the presidential oath in Article II,
6
required by Article VI.7 Perhaps liberals would distinguish political
officials from ordinary citizens, but in a republican form of government,
the most important political office is that of citizen, especially in the
context of the ballot box. Is this reluctance to dispense with oaths
simply a kind of bad faith or does it speak to a lingering commitment,
even among those most suspicious of social claims (as against those
of individual autonomy), to the importance of encumbering otherwise
detached selves within the cloak of shared values?
Consider the implications of Professor Sunstein's comment that
within republican theory (and the neo-republicanism of which he and
Professor Michelman are powerful advocates), citizens and representatives, "in their capacity as political actors . . . are not supposed to
ask only what is in their private interest, but also what will best serve
the community in general - understood as a response to the best
general theory of social welfare. 1 76 It is illuminating that in 1640 Connecticut initiated "The Oath of a Freeman," which continues as a part
of its state law.7 In Connecticut, those who would inhabit the office
of voter - and thus choose the representatives who will make the
basic determinations of the political order - must pledge to strive
for a certain disposition of mind as a predicate condition for holding
that office. Each elector must swear not only that he or she "will be
true and faithful" to the constitutions of Connecticut and of the United
States, but also that "whenever [they] are called upon to give their

73.
74.

8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982).
See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.

75.
76.

Id.
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1550 (footnotes omitted).

77.

I am grateful to Jon Blue, Esq., who provided me with a copy of the original 1640 text

following a talk in which I referred to the modem Connecticut oath. I owe my awareness of
the modern oath to J. Donald Moon and Richard Kay, each of whom had sent me copies of it.
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vote or choice touching any matter which concerns this state or the
United States, [they] will do so in a manner which . . . contributes
to the best interests of Connecticut and the nation, without respect
or favor of any person." 8 This oath neatly encapsulates the republican
vision of chastened individualism, whatever our views may be of the
efficacy of such oaths. I am eager to know, as a theoretical matter,
what neo-republicans like Professor Michelman think of Connecticut's
oath.
Even if one accepts the importance (and legitimacy) of such encumbrances, one might view loyalty oaths like Connecticut's as a zany
way of assuring that voters possess the requisite values. I devoted a
chapter of my book to "deconstructing" the notion of fidelity to the
Constitution by pointing out that no one agrees on what counts as
constitutional "essence." 79- Whether anyone would be disabled from
taking the oath in good faith, therefore, is unclear. In upholding the
Massachusetts oath, Chief Justice Burger admitted that oaths do not
"create specific responsibilities," but rather, "assure that those in positions of public trust [are] willing to commit themselves to live by
the constitutional processes of our system,"8 0 a justification of ambiguous import. Still, criticizing such oaths as vacuous is clearly different
from criticizing them as being the entry point of the totalitarian state.
Those making the first criticism take seriously, as the latter do not,
the notion that membership in community and the right to vote should
be more intimately connected than is now the case.
At a time when George Bush (acting as Lee Atwater's agent)
seems determined to reduce presidential politics to mindless cheerleading in behalf of pledging allegiance to the flag and rallying support
for a constitutional amendment against flag burning, one is more reluctant than ever to say a good word for loyalty oaths. New conditions
on the voting franchise that might make the percentage of actual
voters even more disgracefully low than is now the case are hardly
needed. Yet, for better or worse, we earn our pay as academicians
by scrutinizing the practices of our society and by analyzing their
purported justifications. The point of my argument is not so much to
support imposing oaths on voting as it is to suggest that the opponents
of such an imposition must ultimately present the theoretical basis for
the ballot limitations that now exist in our polity. If they disapprove
of oaths, what supports their willingness to limit the ballot to citizens?

78. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-25 (West 1988) (text of oath); see also id. § 9-20 (West
Supp. 1989) (requirement that electors take oath).
79. See S. LEVINSON, supra note 15, ch. 4.
80. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972).
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Finally, to return to my original query, I remain interested in
discerning whether the response to these conundrums will be affected
significantly by the self-professed "liberalism" or "republicanism" of
the respondents. Scholars spill much ink on the premise that these
abstract terms have operational referents that affect the choices we
make in constructing our political order. Few issues are more basic
than deciding who votes. Do liberals and neo-republicans really differ
in their answer to this question? I have suggested that the answer
might be yes,8 ' but only persons who, proclaiming their own commitment to one of these overarching views, and confronting the conundrums of the ballot, will provide a more definitive answer.
Professor Michelman has once more displayed his marvelous powers
of analysis and insight regarding the most crucial constitutional and
political issues. I can only hope that other scholars will explore the
paths he has outlined and thus provide the evidence needed to answer
my question.

81.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-19.
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